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Abstract 
Social stimuli are a highly salient source of information, and 
seem to possess unique qualities that set them apart from 
other well-known categories. One characteristic is their ability 
to elicit spatial orienting, whereby directional stimuli like eye-
gaze and pointing gestures act as exogenous cues that trigger 
automatic shifts of attention that are difficult to inhibit. This 
effect has been extended to non-social stimuli, like arrows, 
leading to some uncertainty regarding whether spatial 
orienting is specialized for social cues. Using a standard 
spatial cueing paradigm, we found evidence that both a 
pointing hand and arrow are effective cues, but that the hand 
is encoded more quickly, leading to overall faster responses. 
We then extended the paradigm to include multiple cues in 
order to evaluate congruent vs. incongruent cues. Our results 
indicate that faster encoding of the social cue leads to 
downstream effects on the allocation of attention resulting in 
faster orienting. 
Keywords: social cues; spatial cueing; selective attention; 
reflexive orienting; exogenous and endogenous attention 
Introduction 
At a crowded party surrounded by strangers, sharing a 
meal with friends, or catching the eye of your server on a 
café patio, we cannot help but notice and react to the actions 
of those around us. Through the language of glances and 
gestures, physical proximity, and facial expressions, we 
exchange invitations to interact. Interpreting and sending the 
right social cues is a fundamental part of communicating, 
building, and maintaining relationships. At the same time, 
we are not entirely beholden to the social world around us; 
in a crowded coffee shop, we manage to tune others out to 
finish our paper draft. The competition between noticing 
and engaging with others while completing our own 
personal goals is a fundamental question of what influences 
our attention and how these endogenous and exogenous 
processes interact. 
Social cues, and in particular, gaze cues, are seen as 
fundamental to communication (Langton, Watt, & Bruce, 
2000). For example, direct gaze can be seen as an invitation 
to interact, while averted gaze is often used to signal interest 
in other objects and may communicate an invitation for 
others to jointly attend to the same thing. Adults and infants 
are highly sensitive to these gaze cues. Early in life, infants 
preferentially attend to faces and face-like stimuli (Farroni, 
Csibra, Simion & Johnson, 2002), while in adulthood, 
people can rapidly locate faces, even when embedded 
among numerous non-face distractors (Hershler, & 
Hochstein, 2005). Conversely, irrelevant faces interfere with 
locating other non-face objects in a search task (Langton, 
Law, Burton, & Schweinberger, 2008).  
Beyond simply attracting attention, eyes, hands and faces 
can act as cues to distal locations or objects. Pointing, head 
turns, and gaze shifts have all been shown to shift attention 
toward the cued direction, aiding subsequent detection and 
identification of stimuli located there, with only a few 
hundred milliseconds’ exposure to the cue (Driver, Davis, 
Ricciardelli, Kuhn, & Benson, 2007; Friesen, & Kingstone, 
1998; Langton, & Bruce, 1999; Frischen, Bayliss, & Tipper, 
2007; Crostella, Carducci, & Aglioti, 2009; Burton, 
Bindemann, Langton, Schweinberger, & Jenkins, 2009). In 
addition, this effect is resistant to interference, and these 
properties have led some to suggest that social cueing is 
automatic and stimulus driven. Indeed, this proposal is 
consistent with specialized processing of social cues in the 
brain, especially in the superior temporal sulcus (Allison, 
Puce, & McCarthy, 2000). Nevertheless, this view remains 
contentious since there is evidence from other neural 
activation studies showing a large degree of overlap 
between social and non-social stimuli (Tipper, Handy, 
Giesbrecht, & Kingstone, 2008), as well as behavioral 
evidence, including but not limited to spatial cueing tasks 
showing mixed results in distinguishing between social and 
non-social cues (Kuhn, & Benson, 2007; Eimer, 1997; 
Friesen, Ristic, & Kingstone, 2004; Tipples, 2002).  
Accordingly, exogenous cueing of attention may not be 
unique to social stimuli, but rather shared by the broader 
class of directionally-oriented stimuli.  
If it is true that social stimuli are no different in their 
ability to orient attention, what other properties could 
explain the differences observed in other tasks? Birmingham 
and Kingstone (2009; Birmingham, Bischof, & Kingstone, 
2008) suggest that the crucial difference lies in their 
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propensity for attracting, rather than their ability to orient 
attention. This argument, however, is incomplete, in that it 
fails to explain how the selection process distinguishes 
between social and non-social objects. One possibility is 
that encoding of the social stimuli occurs more quickly, 
allowing those items to compete for attentional resources 
sooner. In this light, the design of the standard spatial 
cueing paradigm (Posner, 1980) makes observing a 
difference less likely, as the presentation of a single, isolated 
cue at a known location obviates the need for selective 
attention. Furthermore, even if social cues are detected 
faster or with greater likelihood, the differences may be 
small and obscured by the additional time taken to orient 
towards the periphery, detect the target, and plan the 
appropriate motor response. Differentiating between the 
effects of these multiple component processes is necessary 
for identifying if and how social stimuli are different. 
We began this investigation by using a standard spatial 
cueing paradigm to examine differences in the speed of 
detecting and responding to a peripheral target after the 
appearance of a non-predictive pointing hand or arrow cue. 
It has been argued that hands provide a more salient and 
accurate cue than eye gaze or head direction, but have 
received significantly less study (Langton et al., 2000; 
Ricciardelli, Bricolo, Aglioti, & Chelazzi, 2002). In line 
with previous research, we expected faster encoding and 
thus shorter reaction times in response to a pointing hand as 
compared to an arrow. Moreover, both types of stimuli have 
been shown to be effective cues, so we do not expect any 
difference in their cueing strength, measured as a validity 
effect (invalid – valid RTs).  
Experiment 1 
Methods 
Participants were shown a non-predictive hand or arrow 
cue and tasked with responding to the location of a 
subsequently appearing peripheral target stimulus. The cue 
was visible for either 100 or 600ms before the appearance of 
the peripheral target. Prior research suggests that shorter 
delays tap into automatic or reflexive processes, while a 
greater delay permits more volitional or strategic responding 
(Friesen et al., 1998). Twenty-two undergraduate 
psychology students (11 female, between 18-24 years of 
age) participated as volunteers or for course credit. In all 
experiments, participants reported normal or corrected to 
normal vision and were naive to the purpose of the research. 
Stimuli and Apparatus The stimuli were comprised of 
digital images of either a pointing hand or a flesh colored 
arrow created using Adobe AfterEffects CS5 (Adobe 
Systems, San Jose, CA), and were presented on a 36.6 x 
27cm LCD screen operating at 1024 x 768 pixel resolution. 
Participants were seated approximately 70cm from the 
screen and responded using the ‘1’ or ‘3’ key on the 
computer number pad with their right middle- and index-
fingers. Stimuli were presented using E-Prime presentation 
software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA).  
Procedure Each trial began with a central, white fixation 
cursor, presented for 400, 500, or 600ms. The fixation 
disappeared and was replaced with the central cue, which 
remained visible throughout the rest of the trial. After a 
delay of either 100 or 600ms, the target appeared in the 
periphery and remained on screen until the participant made 
a response, or 5 seconds had elapsed. A blank screen was 
shown between trials for 600, 700, or 800ms (see Figure 1 
for stimulus sizes and arrangement). Subjects were 
instructed to fixate on the center of the screen, and to 
respond to the location where the target appeared as quickly 
and accurately as possible. Additionally, they were informed 
that the cues were non-predictive, such that targets were 
equally likely to appear at the cued and uncued location  
 
Figure 1. (a) Trial Procedure (b) Stimulus arrays used in 
Experiments 1-3. Sizes and distances visually exaggerated 
for clarity; true values shown in degrees of visual angle. 
Design Three within-subjects factors were manipulated. 
Stimulus type referred to either a pointing hand or an arrow. 
The stimulus to target onset asynchrony (SOA) was 100 or 
600ms. Validity referred to whether the target would appear 
at the location cued by the stimulus (valid) or to the 
opposite side of the screen (invalid).  
These factors yielded 8 unique trial types, which were 
each presented with 20 repeats per block for 3 blocks, 
yielding 480 total trials per subject. Within each block, the 
direction of the central cue and the location of the target 
were counterbalanced for each condition. Before beginning 
the experiment, participants completed 16 practice trials and 
were provided feedback on their response time and 
accuracy. Feedback was not provided during the 
experimental trials. 
The overall proportion correct was 98.4% across all 
participants. Due to the low amount of errors, we only 
analyzed correct responses. We also excluded trials with 
reaction times less than 100ms or greater than 800ms to 
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exclude anticipations and inattentive responses, which 
accounted for an additional 1.2% of the total trials. A 2x2x2 
repeated-measures ANOVA with stimulus type, SOA, and 
validity as within-subjects factors was conducted.  
Results & Discussion 
Consistent with the results from previous studies, mean 
response times to valid trials (387ms) were faster than 
invalid trials (401ms), F(1, 21) = 20.18, p < 0.001, 𝜂2 = 
0.490. This result confirms that even though participants 
knew that the cues were irrelevant, they could not 
completely ignore them.  
Response times were also affected by the SOAs. The 
600ms SOA produced faster overall responses (375ms) than 
the 100ms delay (413ms), F(1, 21) = 191.95, p < 0.001, 𝜂2 
= 0.901.  This is likely due to participants having additional 
time to prepare a response (Driver, et al. 1999). 
We hypothesized that the social nature of the pointing 
hand would lead to faster encoding, and thus shorter 
reaction times than the arrow. Our results were consistent 
with this prediction in that the mean reaction time was faster 
to the hand than to the arrow (392 and 397ms respectively), 
F(1, 21) = 10.18, p < 0.01, 𝜂2 = 0.327, though the difference 
was small. The interaction between stimulus and SOA was 
not significant, F(1,21) = 3.70, p = 0.068, suggesting that 
the additional response preparation benefitted both stimulus 
types similarly. Plots showing the main effects are shown in 
Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Reaction time means and standard error shown for 
responses in Experiment 1. Main effects of (a) Validity (b) 
SOA and (c) Stimulus. 
We also tested whether there was a difference between 
valid and invalid cues. The size of the validity effect was 
calculated as the mean invalid – valid RT. Response times 
were analyzed in a 2x2 repeated-measures ANOVA with 
stimulus and SOA as within-subjects factors. Critically, the 
stimulus type was not significant, F(1, 21) = 0.75, p = 
0.396, nor was SOA, F(1, 21) = 0.05, p = 0.826, or the 
interaction, F(1, 21) = 0.15, p = 0.706. These results are 
consistent with our hypothesis that both cues are equally 
effective at shifting attention toward the target for both 
automatic (100ms SOA) as well as more intentional (600ms 
SOA) responses.  
The overall pattern of results was consistent with faster 
encoding of the pointing hand, but the cueing strength for 
both hand and arrow stimuli (i.e., no stimulus effect for the 
validity measure) showed no difference. We earlier 
proposed that this encoding difference is critical in 
explaining how attention can be selectively oriented towards 
social stimuli. In order to test this hypothesis, we needed to 
increase the difficulty of the task to include multiple cues. 
Experiment 2 
White, Ratcliff, and Starns (2011) studied the effect of 
surrounding a central cue with flankers on directional 
judgments, and suggest that multiple cues can 
simultaneously contribute to a directional decision. In this 
experiment, we utilized a similar paradigm to explore 
whether the addition of flanking stimuli facilitate or 
interfere with processing of the central cue. 
Methods 
Twenty undergraduate psychology students (14 female, 
between 18-22 years of age) participated in this experiment 
as volunteers or for course credit. Participants reported 
normal or corrected to normal vision and were naive to the 
purpose of this research.  
Stimuli and Apparatus We modified the stimuli from 
Experiment 1 by pairing the central cue with two additional 
cues of the same type, i.e. three hands arranged horizontally. 
The two flankers were always oriented in the same direction 
as each other, but could point in the opposite direction of the 
central cue. The total horizontal extent of the stimuli 
subtended 6.9° visual angle. The distance between the target 
and the central cue remained the same as Experiment 1. 
Design 
As in Experiment 1, we manipulated the stimulus type 
(hand vs. arrow), and the SOA between cue and target (100 
vs. 600). With the addition of the two flanking cues, validity 
was defined as the relationship between the central cue and 
the target location. We term the relationship between the 
directionality of the flankers and the central stimulus 
‘congruence.’ Trials were ‘congruent’ when all three stimuli 
pointed in the same direction, and ‘incongruent’ when the 
central cue pointed opposite the two flankers. Thus, on a 
‘valid, congruent’ trial, all three stimuli pointed toward the 
target, while on an ‘invalid, congruent’ trial, none of them 
did. Conversely, on a ‘valid, incongruent’ trial, the central 
cue alone pointed towards the target location, while on an 
‘invalid, incongruent’ trial, only the flankers pointed toward 
the target. Again, we emphasize that none of the cues were 
predictive of the target location, and subjects were informed 
about this property. 
The full-factorial design yielded 16 conditions, each of 
which was presented 10 times per block, which was 
repeated three times for a total of 480 trials. Before 
beginning the experiment, participants completed 16 
practice trials and were provided feedback on their response 
time and accuracy. We excluded incorrect trials (2.4%) and 
filtered based on RT (additional 0.6%) of trials.  
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Results & Discussion 
In accordance with Experiment 1, subjects responded 
faster when the SOA was 600ms (355.8ms) than 100ms 
(396.5ms), F(1, 19) = 124.39, p < 0.001, 𝜂2 = 0.867. 
Additionally, the central cue seemed to exhibit a stronger 
overall effect than the flankers, as the main effect of validity 
was also significant, F(1, 19) = 6.52, p = 0.019, 𝜂2 = 0.255, 
with faster overall RTs for valid trials (374.1ms) than for 
invalid (378.5ms). In contrast to Experiment 1, there was no 
main effect of stimulus on response times, F(1, 19) = 1.69, p 
= 0.209, with reaction times to the hand (375.3ms) nearly 
identical to those for the arrow (377.4ms). One explanation 
is that the redundant cueing of the flankers facilitated 
encoding for both stimulus types, bringing both close to a 
floor, or minimum, encoding time. 
We expected the flankers to contribute some influence on 
orienting beyond the central cue. The interaction of 
congruence and validity was significant, F(1, 19) = 64.67, p 
< 0.001, 𝜂2 = 0.773 , indicating that the arrangement of the 
flankers influenced response times (see Figure 3).  
To better understand the role of the flankers on orienting, 
we tested the validity effect. On congruent trials we 
observed a mean RT advantage for valid trials of 23ms, 
while incongruent trials showed an advantage in the 
opposite direction, on average of 14ms, a reversal of 34ms. 
These differences were both significantly different from 
zero, t(19) = 7.47, p < 0.001, t(19) = -4.80, p < 0.001 for 
congruent and incongruent trials respectively. The 
incongruent flankers thus not only mitigated the cueing 
effect of the central stimulus, but actually exerted a greater 
influence and shifted attention to the opposite side. This is a 
critical finding because it indicates that, while located away 
from participants’ point of gaze, the two flanking stimuli 
were attended and exerted a greater net influence on 
orienting than the central cue. Lastly, the interaction of 
congruence with stimulus type was not significant, F(1, 19) 
= 1.84, p = 0.191, suggesting the strength of the cues was 
the same for both types of stimulus.  
The greater cueing strength provided by the redundant 
cues appears to have created a floor effect and eliminated 
the stimulus specific effects seen in Experiment 1. To test 
our critical hypothesis, that encoding speed differences will 
predict differential allocation of attention towards social vs. 
non-social stimuli when the two are present simultaneously, 
we modified the current paradigm by placing hands and 
arrows together in the same stimulus array. 
Experiment 3 
In the preceding experiment, flankers modulated the 
directional influence of the central cue when all three 
stimuli were from the same class. In this experiment, we test 
the critical prediction of the selection hypothesis: when 
presented with both social and non-social stimuli, attention 
should be biased towards processing the social cues as the 
result of faster encoding. Specifically, we predict that 
incongruent flanking arrows will not significantly interfere 
with a central hand, and thus a validity effect (valid < 
invalid) will still be observed.  By contrast, incongruent 
flanking hands should interfere with the central arrow 
resulting in a reverse of the validity effect (invalid < valid).  
Methods 
The procedure and design for Experiment 3 was identical 
to Experiment 2 with one exception; rather than showing 
three of the same stimuli, we included hands and arrows 
within the same display. The flankers were always pairs of 
the same class (e.g. two arrows or two hands) and matched 
with a central cue from the other class (e.g. hands flanking a 
single arrow or vice versa). Overall error percentages were 
low (0.5% of trials) and filtering based on reaction times 
excluded another 1.1% of trials.  
Results & Discussion 
In line with the previous experiments, we observed a main 
effect of SOA, F(1, 19) = 296.79, p < 0.001, 𝜂2 = 0.940 
with longer SOAs showing faster responses, and a main 
effect of validity, F(1, 19) = 30.67, p < 0.001, 𝜂2 = 0.617, 
with valid responses overall faster than invalid.  
Our main prediction was that the flankers would produce 
different effects depending on the stimulus arrangement. 
When the arrows flanked the hand, we expected them to 
have a smaller effect than when the hands flanked the 
arrows. For congruent stimuli, the addition of the flankers 
should bolster the validity effect. This was the case: the 
addition of congruent hand flankers provided a bigger boost 
to the central arrow (21ms) than the congruent arrows 
provided the central hand (14ms). When all three stimuli 
were hands the validity effect was larger (Experiment 2; 
22.3ms) than when the flankers were arrows (Experiment 3; 
14ms), though a post-hoc t-test showed no significant 
difference, t(38) = 1.85, p = 0.073 (two-tailed).  
Even more striking are the results from the incongruent 
condition. When the hands and arrows provided conflicting 
information, targets in the direction cued by the hand(s) 
always led to faster response times, regardless of whether 
they were placed in the center or appeared as flankers. This 
effect is visible as a 10ms reversal of the validity effect 
between centrally presented hands and arrows (see the blue 
bars in Figure 4). Consistent with these results, the 
interaction between stimulus and congruence was 
significant, F(1, 19) = 5.24, p < 0.05, 𝜂2 = 0.216.  
Together, these results suggest that the pointing hand 
stimuli automatically drew attention at the expense of 
attention towards the arrows. The asymmetry of the 
flankers’ influence is best understood in terms of faster 
encoding of the hands as compared to the arrows.  This 
initial difference during encoding resulted in a cascading 
effect, leading to faster responses to targets cued by the 
direction of the hands. 
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Figure 3. Validity effect (Invalid – Valid reaction times) for 
response times in Experiment 2. Here we show the main 
effect of Stimulus and lack of interaction of the Stimulus 
type with Congruence. 
 
Figure 4. Validity effect for response times in Experiment 3, 
showing the interaction between Stimulus and Congruence. 
Note the label on the x-axis refers to the central stimulus 
which was always paired with flankers from the other class. 
One alternative explanation for the differences in 
Experiment 3 is that the stimuli differed on low-level 
features like contrast or spatial frequency. In order to 
address this question, we utilized a computational salience 
algorithm (Harel, Koch, & Perona, 2006) to compute a 
feature-based prediction of attention for each stimulus array. 
To rule out a featural bias towards the flankers, we 
calculated the ratio of the total salience on the flankers 
relative to the central cue. These ratios did not correlate with 
the size of the validity effect, p = 0.982, suggesting any low-
level changes were insufficient to account for the changes 
we saw. Flanker to central ratios and graphical depictions of 
the predicted distributions for each stimulus configuration 
are shown in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5. Output from the salience algorithm (Harel at al., 
2006) showing the feature-based prediction of the 
distribution of attention and flanker-to-central ratios for the 
four stimulus configurations used in Experiment 3. (a) 
Congruent, Arrow: 1.33 (b) Incongruent, Arrow: 1.42 (c) 
Congruent, Hand: 1.57 (d) Incongruent, Hand: 1.37.  
General Discussion 
In Experiment 1, we showed that the pointing hands 
generated faster overall response times, but saw no 
difference in the magnitude of the validity effect. These 
results are in line with faster encoding of the social cue, but 
no difference in speed of orienting. We modified the basic 
paradigm in Experiment 2 to include flankers from the same 
stimulus type as the central cue. The presence of the 
flankers modulated the effect of the central cue on both 
congruent and incongruent trials, suggesting simultaneous 
processing of all three stimuli. Moreover, their presence 
eliminated the stimulus differences in Experiment 1, which 
suggests that the redundant cues facilitated encoding of both 
the hands and arrows. Finally, in Experiment 3, we 
leveraged participants’ ability to process multiple cues to pit 
pointing hands and arrows against one another. We found 
evidence suggesting that participants’ faster encoding of the 
hand stimuli resulted in preferential attention towards the 
hands, and ultimately a greater influence on subsequent 
orienting. 
Previous research has brought to light important 
differences in the way we attend and process social stimuli, 
but has struggled to disentangle the multitude of component 
processes that contribute to the observed results. Our 
findings are consistent with the position put forth by 
Birmingham and Kingstone (2009) which proposes that 
social stimuli preferentially attract attention. Moreover, we 
suggest this preference emerges as a downstream effect of 
early encoding differences. 
The competing explanation, that the differences between 
social and non-social stimuli lie in the speed of orienting, 
was not supported. The validity effect provides a measure of 
the strength of the stimulus cue for covertly orienting 
attention. The size of the validity effect was no different 
940
  
between the hands and arrows in either Experiment 1 or 
Experiment 2. Only in Experiment 3, when the two stimuli 
competed for attention, did we see a stronger validity effect 
in favor of the hands on both congruent and incongruent 
trials. These results are most parsimoniously explained by 
faster encoding of the directionality of the pointing hands, 
without positing the additional effect of orienting 
differences. 
An alternative account of the observed difference between 
the hand and arrow is via low level features like spatial 
contrast. We employed one algorithm and found no 
relationship between the computed salience of the stimuli 
and participants’ relative attention towards the central and 
flanking cues. However, a number of limitations preclude us 
from completely ruling out this account. This algorithm was 
designed to estimate where subjects would fixate during an 
extended, free viewing paradigm, and our stimuli occupied a 
relatively small region of the screen subtending only about 
7° of visual angle. Subjects were instructed to attend to the 
preceding fixation cursor and knew the location of the 
stimulus array, so it is reasonable to assume their point of 
gaze was directed towards the stimuli. This approach thus 
only provides an account of how attention may have been 
distributed across the multiple stimuli during the first 
fixation. To better distinguish between category and feature-
based accounts, future experiments should directly 
manipulate low level properties as in the work of Sui, 
Rotshtein, and Humphreys (2013). 
References 
Allison, T., Puce, A., & McCarthy, G. (2000). Social 
perception from visual cues: role of the STS regions. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4(7), 267–278. 
Birmingham, E., Bischof, W.F., & Kingstone, A. (2008). 
Gaze selection in complex social scenes. Visual 
Cognition, 16(2/3), 341-355. 
Birmingham, E., & Kingstone, A. (2009). Human social 
attention: A new look at past, present, and future 
investigations. Annals of the New York Academy of 
Sciences, 1156, 118–40.  
Burton, A. M., Bindemann, M., Langton, S. R. H., 
Schweinberger, S. R., & Jenkins, R. (2009). Gaze 
perception requires focused attention: evidence from an 
interference task. Journal of Experimental Psychology. 
Human Perception and Performance, 35(1), 108–18. 
Crostella, F., Carducci, F., & Aglioti, S. M. (2009). 
Reflexive social attention is mapped according to 
effector-specific reference systems. Experimental Brain 
Research, 197(2), 143–51. 
Driver, J., Davis, G., Ricciardelli, P., Kidd, P., Maxwell, E., 
& Baron-Cohen, S. (1999). Gaze perception triggers 
reflexive visuospatial orienting. Visual Cognition, 6(5), 
509–540. 
Eimer, M. (1997). Uninformative symbolic cues may bias 
visual-spatial attention: Behavioural and 
electrophysiological evidence. Biological Psychiatry, 46, 
67–71. 
Farroni, T., Csibra, G., Simion, F., Johnson, M. H. (2002). 
Eye contact detection in humans from birth. Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States 
of America, 99(14), 9602-9605. 
Friesen, C. K., & Kingstone, A. (1998). The eyes have it! 
Reflexive orienting is triggered by nonpredictive gaze. 
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 5(3), 490–495. 
Friesen, C. K., Ristic, J., & Kingstone, A. (2004). 
Attentional effects of counterpredictive gaze and arrow 
cues. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance, 30, 319–329. 
Frischen, A., Bayliss, A. P., & Tipper, S. P. (2007). Gaze 
cueing of attention: visual attention, social cognition, and 
individual differences. Psychological Bulletin, 133(4), 
694–724. 
Harel, J., Koch, C., & Perona, P. (2006). Graph-Based 
Visual Saliency. Proceedings of the Neural Information 
Processing Systems (NIPS). 
Hershler, O., & Hochstein, S. (2005). At first sight: a high-
level pop out effect for faces. Vision Research, 45(13), 
1707–24.  
Kuhn, G., & Benson, V. (2007). The influence of eye-gaze 
and arrow pointing distractor cues on voluntary eye 
movements. Perception & Psychophysics, 69(6), 966–
971. 
Langton, S. R. H., & Bruce, V. (1999). Reflexive Visual 
Orienting in Response to the Social Attention of Others. 
Visual Cognition, 6(5), 541–567. 
Langton, S. R. H., Watt, R. J., & Bruce, V. (2000). Do the 
eyes have it? Cues to the direction of social attention. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4(2), 50-59.  
Langton, S. R. H., Law, A. S., Burton, A. M., & 
Schweinberger, S. R. (2008). Attention capture by faces. 
Cognition, 107(1), 330–342.  
Posner, M. I. (1980). Orienting of attention. Quarterly 
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 32, 3–25. 
Ricciardelli, P., Bricolo, E., Aglioti, S. M., & Chelazzi, L. 
(2002). My eyes want to look where your eyes are 
looking: exploring the tendency to imitate another 
individual’s gaze. Neuroreport, 13(17), 2259-2264. 
Sui, J., Rotshtein, P., Humphreys, G. W. (2013). Coupling 
social attention to the self forms a network for personal 
significant. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, 110(19), 7607-7612. 
Tipper, C. M., Handy, T. C., Giesbrecht, B., & Kingstone, 
A. (2008). Brain responses to biological relevance. 
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 20(5), 879–91. 
Tipples, J. (2002). Eye gaze is not unique: automatic 
orienting in response to uninformative arrows. 
Psychonomic Bulletin &  Review, 9(2), 314-318.  
White, C. N., Ratcliff, R., & Starns, J. J. (2011). Diffusion 
models of the flanker task: discrete versus gradual 
attentional selection. Cognitive Psychology, 63(4), 210–
38.  
 
941
